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The Right of Attribution in Literary
Works in Three Acts,
by W. Shakespeare
Daniel J. Gervais*
ABSTRACT

This Article charts the three phases in the evolution of the norm of
attribution in literary works: the norm in England before and during
Shakespeare's time, the emergence of authorship-based norms in the
Romantic period (allowingmoral rights to be enshrined in international
copyright treaties) and their demise at the hands of postmodernism and
New Criticism, and the current norms that aim to protect the integrity
of educationalprocesses and to inform readers and other users of books,
plays, or other creative works about their "source." It tracks a debate
during Shakespeare's lifetime on the difference between nonattribution
and false attribution. It suggests that current attribution norms can be
put in parallelwith trademarks and are meant to protect both authors
and the public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article illuminates how behavioral patterns of
appropriation, attribution, misattribution, and plagiarism changed
starting around the time of William Shakespeare and how such changes
in norms influenced the emergence of copyright.
A key element of plagiarism is the lack of attribution to the
original author of a work. 1 This Article charts the three phases in the
evolution of the norm of attribution in literary works. Briefly, the first
phase of authorial attribution began in England as a means to trace the
author of a work, mostly for the purpose of censorship by or on behalf
of the Crown. 2 During the second phase, an attribution norm based on
the notion of authors and their authorship-i.e., paternity-emerged.
This is often associated with the Romantic notion of the author.
Although this change was driven on the European Continent by
1.

See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.

2.
See Catherine M.A. McCauliff, The Right to Resist the Government: Tyranny,
Usurpation, and Regicide in Shakespeare's Plays, 14 ILSA J. INTL & CoMP. L. 9, 27 (2007)
("Shakespeare juxtaposes the royal family's exclusionary view of government with the claim of the
commons of England to have more of a voice in governance. The fictional character of the Queen
(Richard II was in fact a widower, engaged to an underage foreign princess) emphasizes the
importance to Shakespeare of presenting the different views about which groups might have a
voice in governing England, if only to satisfy the demands of censorship by including the royal
position.").
There is what may well be a geographically limited emergence of attribution much
earlier than Kant and eighteenth-century philosophers-namely, the late fifteenth-century Venice
where exclusive printer privileges started to emerge. Though such privileges focused mostly on
inventors, not authors, they "released individual initiative from the secretive cocoon of the guild,
and rewarded ingenuity with the luster of fame as well as the chance to make a fortune."
ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 240 (1979).
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emerging notions of authorship in works by Kant and others, the norm
was adopted in Britain to, for the most part, falsely attribute a work to
a famous author for the purpose of selling more copies, also referred to
as reverse plagiarism. Finally, the third-and current-phase retains
some, but relatively few, of the notions deriving from the Romantic
conception of authorship, because most of those notions did not survive
postmodernism and New Criticism. Current norms mostly see a lack of
attribution or false attribution as a constructive wrong prohibited by
law or other forms of regulations (such as university bylaws and codes
of honor) with two major societal purposes: to protect the integrity of
educational processes and to inform readers and other users of books,
plays, or other creative works about their "source." 3 Attribution has
become, in significant part, like a trademark.
First, this Article provides a brief review of earlier forms of
attribution norms. Then, it chronologically explores those three phases
in the evolution of the norm of attribution.
II. PLAGIARISM IN CONTEXT
A. Defining Plagiarism
Plagiarism is not illegal per se.4 It can take two main forms.
Direct plagiarism has two components-namely, (a) copying or
paraphrasing text or other material (e.g., charts), and (b) lack of
attribution to the original author.5 Plagiarism can also be indirect, what

&

3.
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Plagiarism in Cyberspace: Learning the Rules of Recycling
Content with a View Towards NurturingAcademic Trust in an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J.L.
TECH. 10, 23 (2006).

4.
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, A Taxonomy of Borrowing, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 951, 967 (2014) ("Because plagiarism is not, strictly speaking, a legal wrong,
there is no statutory definition of the term. It appears in a number of institutional honor codes,
and is clearly a matter of concern in the commercial publishing world.").
5.
See Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar,Attribution, and Plagiarism,33 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 4 (2005) ("The offense lies not in the act of copying, but in the act of copying without
attribution.") Naturally, this isn't meant as a standard definition applicable in all situations, as
each institution, especially in higher education, tends to define plagiarism in a specific way. See
Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that "[e]ach academic community defines plagiarism for
itself'). The term plagiarism has been used in other fields, such as music and even semiconductor
chips. For music, see Julie Levine, Lo and Behold!: Does Tolerated Use Give an Incentive to
Plagiarize?An Example Through the Music of Bob Dylan, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 717, 727
(2014); lyar Stay, Musical Plagiarism:A True Challengefor the Copyright Law, 25 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2014) (comparing the law of various jurisdictions and the ties between
plagiarism and copyright infringement in the field of music). For semiconductors, see Thomas
Hoeren, The Protection of Pioneer Innovations - Lessons Learnt from the Semiconductor Chip
Industry and Its IP Law Framework, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 151, 181 (2016).
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US federal policy refers to as "the appropriation of another person s
ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit."6

Plagiarism is widely regarded as a wrong in contemporary
American society, even beyond educational institutions.7 Nowadays, the
actus reus of direct plagiarism (copying and paraphrasing) is subject to
computerized detection by systems widely used by schools and
universities, such as Turnitin.8 A harder question is whether a mens
rea element-that is, intent or knowledge that the act would violate
applicable norms-is required? 9 Professor David Nimmer argued that
in the field of plagiarism, innocence is "easy to claim and difficult to
disprove."10 Another scholar noted in the same vein that "[i]ntent
elements invite the defense that the student did not understand
scholarly procedures or the meaning of plagiarism." 1 In contrast, Judge

For semiconductors, see Lee Hsu, Reverse Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act: Complicationsfor Standard of Infringement, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249, 264 n.114 (1996).
6.
Federal Research Misconduct Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 76260, 76262 (Dec. 6, 2000).
7.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 787,
789 (2007) ("[P]owerful pro-attribution norms exist throughout modern American society. Both
authors and audiences generally accept that attribution is important to authors, and that false
attribution, especially plagiarism, is a moral wrong.").
8.
See Michael G. Bennett, The Edge of Ethics in iParadigms, 2009 B.C. INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. F. 1, 1 (2009) ("TurnitinM is widely used for detection of unoriginality in student-produced
texts.").
9.
See Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 20 (observing that published plagiarism standards "fall
into two camps, those with and without intent elements"). The term mens rea is neither excessive
nor inappropriate in this context, as plagiarism can sometimes interact with criminal law. See
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual PropertyRights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 181 (2002)
("Perhaps some of the confusion about the moral status of plagiarism can be attributed to a deeper
confusion about the mental element, if any, necessary for its commission. Some ethical codes
prohibit only 'intentional or 'knowing' plagiarism. Others prohibit plagiarism that is either
'intentional or 'unintentional' -that is, they treat plagiarism as a kind of 'strict liability' offense.
Finally, a large number of codes (surely, a majority) prohibit unattributed copying without
specifying what, if any, form of mens rea is required.").
The need to show intent could be satisfied by a showing of (gross) negligence,
recklessness, etc. For example, Duke University states that plagiarism "occurs when a student,
with intent to deceive or with reckless disregardfor proper scholarly procedures, presents any
information, ideas, or phrasing of another as if they were his/her own and/or does not give
appropriate credit to the original source." DUKE UNIV., THE DUKE COMMUNITY STANDARD IN
PRACTICE:
A
GUIDE
FOR
UNDERGRADUATES
2017-2018
16
(2017),
https://regis-

trar.duke. edu/sites/default/files/bulletins/20 17- 18/DCS0%20Guide% 2020 17- 18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4SY-H5DF] (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Kulynych, Intent to Deceive:
Mental State and Scienter in the New Uniform Federal Definition of Scientific Misconduct, 1998
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 68 (1998) (proposing a standard for federal research misconduct that "covers
knowing, reckless, and grossly negligent fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism").
10.
Gener-Villar v. Adcom Grp, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

11.

Gerhardt, supra note 3.

§

13.08 (3rd ed. 1994)).
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Richard Posner has argued that plagiarism could be defined as
fraudulent copying, thus presupposing some form of both knowledge
and intent. 12
Whether or not intent is built into the definition of plagiarism,
to proscribe it there must be a norm that the actus reus labeled as
plagiarism violates, such as a university code of honor. As this Article
explicates, such a norm either did not exist or was very weak at the
beginning of Shakespeare's writing career but grew progressively
stronger.
B. The Emergence of PremodernAttribution Norms
In its early form, what one might call plagiarism resembled a
form of theft. 13 Professor Nimmer has found traces of a rule against
plagiarism and lack of attribution both in the court of King Cyrus and
in ancient Egypt.1 4 Plagium was also present in the laws of ancient
Rome, where it applied to the "theft" of text as well as persons. 15 As
Professor Cheryl Swack explained in her study of Roman Empire
plagiarism, "[e]pigrammist Marcus Valerius Martialis (40 A.D.-104
A.D.) first used plagium to combat thefts of his verses." 16 Yet plagium
was defined narrowly and not applied uniformly, as copying was
sometimes seen as a sign of respect, for example, to a master from whom
the work was copied.17

12.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 49 (2007). See also Kulynych,

supra note 9, at 91 (observing that the definition of misconduct in federal policy is "rendered
uncertain by ambiguities in the wording" and, further, that the "lack of precise mental state
language in the definitions of scientific misconduct has left the entire scope of sanctionable conduct
uncomfortably vague, and has rendered standards inconsistent from one agency to another")
(emphasis added).
After reviewing this history, Richard Posner noted, rightly, that plagiarism was
13.
difficult to define but that a "typical dictionary definition is 'literary theft.' The definition is
incomplete because there can be plagiarism of music, pictures, or ideas, as well as of verbal
matter . . . . The definition is also inaccurate . . . there can be plagiarism without theft." POSNER,

supra note 12, at 11-12.
14.
David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism(Without aMoral
Right Against Reverse PassingOff), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004).
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 49-50.
15.
16.
Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 361,
365-66 (1998).
17.
See Edward L. Carter, Copyright Ownership of Online News: Cultivating a
TransformationEthos in America's Emerging Statutory Attribution Right, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y
161, 178 (2011) ("Roman authors disliked plagiarism of their works but did not define the term too
broadly because the copying of ideas and even exact passages from previous authors was accepted
practice and even a sign of respect.").
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In the Middle Ages, rules against plagiarism waned in Europe.1 8
Much art was created at the behest of the Church and often entirely
lacked attribution to the artist. Medieval and premodern writing was
often openly derivative, in the form of compilatio.19 Compilatios were
often mere juxtapositions of preexisting "content" transitioning from
orality to textuality.20 The notion of attribution was essentially absent
in such cases. What mattered was the work, not its authors.
It was in Florence that the modern idea of protecting authors'
rights in their works first developed, though the protection was not for
books but rather for works of art. Professor Swack observed a parallel
between the rise in attribution to the artists and a shift in patronage
patterns from the church to other wealthy private patrons (e.g., the de
Medici family). 2 1 A number of private patrons started hiring "names" to
create works of art for them. 22 Some artists-most prominently among
them, the Renaissance artist, Michelangelo Buonarotti-played a role
by requesting attribution as a condition to producing works of art and
even what today might be called a right of integrity in their creations:
First, Michelangelo asserted his right of attribution after completing a commission
to sculpt a piet5 to grace the chapel of St. Maria della Febbre in St. Peter's

Cathedral. .. . Second, Michelangelo, protecting his right of disclosure during the
painting of the Sistine Chapel, refused to allow Pope Julius I to see his unfinished
sketches. . . . [T]hird, within the right of integrity lies an intrinsic presumption that
the work an artist creates is his.23

A key question to which this Article returns below is whether
the notions of attribution and integrity present in sixteenth-century
Florence were also present in England then-that is, in Shakespeare's
time. The answer, as to be seen, is a pallid yes, for borrowings were still
The discussion in this Article focuses on Europe because its pivot is Shakespeare, but
18.
a cultural point should be made, as plagiarism is tied to culture and the norms against it differ in
various parts of the world. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19-29 (1995); Lise Buranen, "ButI Wasn't
Cheating": Plagiarism and Cross-CulturalMythology, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 63, 66 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds.,
1999); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329,

399-400 (2012).
19.
Max W. Thomas, Eschewing Credit: Heywood, Shakespeare, and PlagiarismBefore
Copyright, 31 NEW LITERARY HIST. 277, 282 (2000).
20.
Giancarlo F. Frosio, Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity from the Oral Formulaic
Tradition to DigitalRemix: Can I Get a Witness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 341, 346

(2014).
21.

Swack, supra note 16, at 368-69.

22.
See Dan Rosen, Artists'Moral Rights: A EuropeanEvolution, an American Revolution,
2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 167 (1983); Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership
to Intellectual Property:Part II from the Age of Printingto the Future, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45, 46
(1976).

23.

Swack, supra note 16, at 368-369.
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very common in both literature (including poetry) and painting, and
this remained true for well over a century after Shakespeare's death. 24
Now, let us open the curtain on Shakespearean notions of attribution,
or lack thereof.

III. THE THREE ACTS OF MODERN ATTRIBUTION
A. Act I: Protecting the State
In Act I, the main actor is the State, acting both as legislator in
the public interest and in its own interest. The Crown established a
licensing system designed at least as much to control and censor speech
as to provide an economic incentive to produce and sell books. 25 The
first Act was transformative in that it allowed the emergence in a
common-law environment of a legal notion of something like "property"
in immaterial objects.
To tell this story, first consider the establishment of the book
licensing system granting a de facto monopoly to the Stationers'
Company (the "Company") and, second, how this system was extended
to theater.
1. Book Licensing and the Emergence of Property in Immaterial
Objects
The Tudors imposed limits on the printing and circulation of
books and plays. 26 The attribution of books and plays to their authors
in that context was not primarily linked to a desire to associate an
author or "writing self' to the book or play. 2 7 It derived from a more
sinister motivation-namely, the State's desire to control and censor;
putting one's name on a work implies potential liability for its
contents. 28
Philip and Mary granted a charter to the Company to control the
printing and circulation of books in 1557.29 It became the main arm of
the Crown in regulating printing. Henry VIII had already granted
certain publishers a patent-enforced initially by the Privy Council and
then by the Star Chamber, the judicial branch of the Privy Council until

24.

POSNER, supra note 12, at 61.

25.
See FREDERICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 72-73 (1965).

26.
27.
28.

29.

See id. at 56.
See id. at 46.
See id.
See id. at 65.
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its abolition in July 1641-with which patentees could ask for
protection against piracy. 30 Patents, like personal property, could be
transferred. 3 1
Licensing by the Stationers' Company became the dominant
system to control the publication and circulation of books. 32 The charter
of the Company prohibited all printing except by members of the
Company or by publishers licensed by the Crown. 33 Indeed, "both Mary
and Elizabeth expected them to keep a tight rein on member printers
in return for the grant of a royal charter." 34 The Company had its own
court, known as the Court of Assistants or "Table." 35 During the reign
of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), records show that books published without
a license could lead to the imposition of fines by the Stationers'
Company. 36
In 1586, a Star Chamber decree became "the most
comprehensive regulation of the entire Tudor period, continuing in
effect until 1637."37 Starting in 1588, the decree required all printed
matter be recorded in the Stationers' Register together with the name
of one or both wardens (also known as treasurers) of the Company. 38 In
addition to the power to "govern" the "art or mistery [trade] of
stationery," the decree also granted search and seizure powers to the
Company 39-the right to seize and burn books "printed contrary to the
form of any statute, act, or proclamation." 40

30.
See id. at 74-75, 166-77.
31.
See id. at 76.
32.
This was combined with control on the use of the number of printing presses. See
Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 320 (2008).
See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 68; see also D. Victoria Baranetsky, Encryption and the
33.
Press Clause, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 179, 188-92 (2017) ("During the seventeenth
century, the Crown imposed corporal and even capital punishment on those who used new printing
technology of their own accord.").
34.
SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 71-72.
35.
See id. at 76, 167. The Court of Assistants was not a real court of law. It tended to
impose fines in case of conflict between publishers. See id. at 80-81.
36.
See id. at 55-58. The term Stationer was used to distinguish publishers and
booksellers from printers. See id. at 65; see also Lee, supra note 32, at 321 ("Elizabeth I issued the
Star Chamber Decree of 1586, which was 'the most comprehensive regulation of the press of the
entire Tudor period.' The Decree required that all printers register their presses with the
Stationers' Company . . . . All presses were subject to warrantless searches by wardens of the
Stationers' Company.") (footnotes omitted).
SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 61.
37.
38.
Id. at 63.
39.
See id. at 62, 69-70, 82-83; L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the "Exclusive Right" of
Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9 (1993).
40.
Patterson, supra note 39.
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Interestingly, the right in "copies" (books) was ordinarily
perpetual when entered into the Company's register, but only while the
book was in print.4 1 According to a Company order adopted in 1588, if a
publisher did not reprint a book that was out of print within six months
after being asked to reissue it, it could be reprinted by "any journeyman
who was willing to take the original owner into partnership." 42 The
Company thus had a perpetual right to control publication of books-a
"private-law copyright" as Professor Ray Patterson termed it-that
predated the "public-law" copyright (the Statute of Anne of 1709-1710)
by a century and a half.4 3 That private law arrangement was in effect
for most of Shakespeare's lifetime.
Patterson has argued that the real motivation for the charter
was to "secure the allegiance of the stationers as policemen of the press
for the sovereign."4 4 This seems correct, for the Company licensed books
but did not require attribution to an author, only the publisher's
imprint, and it would take time for this to shift to include authors'
names.4 5
The regime during the Tudor period, which continued well into
the seventeenth century, was a mixture of royal privileges granted to
certain publishers and the Stationers' Company's licensing system.
The early Stuart kings (1603-1714) tried to maintain the Tudor
policy of control, despite growing opposition to the restrictions on a free
press.4 6 They used patents to reserve certain fields to certain printers
and to support the Company.4 7 However, the system, which was based
on the royal prerogative to control printing, started to weaken in 1629
when the legality of an overbroad patent was contested before the
courts.4 8 Yet the Company managed to maintain its stronghold. Indeed,
in 1637, Charles I retained printing squarely in its hands by issuing a
new decree. 4 9

41.
See id.; SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 80.
42.
See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 80.
43.
Statute of Anne 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.); see also Patterson, supra note 39, at 10.
44.
Patterson, supra note 39.
45.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 59 ("As self-serving publicists, early printers .... put
their firm's name, emblem and shop address on the front page of their books. . . . they put
themselves first. Scribal colophons had come last. They also extended their new promotional
techniques to the authors and artists whose work they published, thus contributing to the
celebration of lay-culture heroes and to their achievement of personal celebrity and eponymous
fame.").
46.
See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 128.
47.
See id. at 129, 245.
48.
See id. at 133.
49.
See id. at 134. The decree of 1637 has been described as "the most complete and
detailed regulation of the early seventeenth century." Id. at 142.
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In Act I, although the purpose of this early attribution norm can
be linked to censorship, the notion of "immaterial property"-that is,
ownership of the ideas contained in a book-also emerged. Indeed, the
ban on printing the "same book" by another member of the Company
resembled the exclusive reproduction right that forms part of the
modern copyright bundle because this property right-though not
authorial in nature-did not attach to a physical "book" but rather to
the intangible "work" contained in the book.5 0 The term property can
thus be used here in a broad sense to refer to "behavioral patterns of
human beings, typically as prescribed by the text" of a specific law, such
as copyright, but also sometimes embodied in social norms supported
only by general legal principles. 5 1 The key point is that the object of this
property differentiated between material and immaterial, a book and
an intellectual property right, respectively. The res that is viewed as
property was an abstract concept independent from the materiality of
the reifier, such as a tangible book. 52 The book was also, to quote
historian Elizabeth Eisenstein, the source of "print-made immortality"
that affected the "drive for fame." 53

It may strike the reader as anachronistic to speak of immaterial
property-as the term is now understood at least-in Shakespeare's
time, because the first statute creating literary property in plays and
books was the abovementioned Statute of Anne of 1710, enacted
roughly a century after Shakespeare's death and the end of the House
of

Tudor

in

1603.54

However,

Shakespeare

plays

abound

in

anachronisms, like the discussion between Brutus and Cassius about a
5 5 Joking aside, the abstract right, combining the
clock in Julius Caesar!
publisher's monopoly and the need to attribute a work to a source,
allowed a doctrinal vehicle to emerge that paved the way for modern
copyright, both at common law and as a right anchored in statute.
The Company's monopoly was reinforced by the passage of the
Licensing Act of 1643, which followed two years of chaos after the fall
of the Star Chamber.56 The 1643 Act can be seen both as confirming the
importance of the emergence of immaterial property as a key doctrinal

50.

See JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR'S DUE 39 (2002).

51.
Andreas Rahmatian, Money as a Normative Text, 13 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 221, 224. (2014).
52.
See id.
53.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 121.
54.
See Patterson, supra note 39, at 12.
55.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 2, sc. 1 ("BRUTUS: Peace! count the clock.
CASSIUS: The clock hath stricken three."). There were no such clocks in 44 BC. Many more
anachronisms appear in his plays, of course. Aaron's reference to "popish tricks" in Titus
Andronicus is another good one. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TITUS ANDRONICUS act 5, sc. 1.

56.

See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 186-87.
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tool, and as creating for the first time the former notion of the owner at
common law of the contents of a book, instead of the tangible object.5 7
Additional legislative acts were adopted in 1649, 1653, and 1662, and
the monopoly, though shaken by events at the end of the seventeenth
century and the beginning of the eighteenth, finally ended in 1731, but
not without major hiccups.5 8 The 1662 Act expired in 1694, making it
difficult to enforce the "copyright" that followed from entry into the
Stationers' Register.5 9 After 1694, printing was "regulated" by the
courts applying the law of seditious libel and by imposing a stamp tax. 0
It was only with the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710 that order
was restored. 6 1
During this period, rights of authors made a quick appearance
on the stage. In January 1641 and 1642, the House of Commons ordered
printers to refrain from printing "without the name and consent of the
author" in response to complaints by authors whose works were being
published without either attribution or consent. 62 As this Article
explores, authors would eventually become named rights holders in the
Statute of Anne. 63 For now, consider how the licensing of books was
applied to theater.
2. Licensing of Plays
The Crown extended the censorship of books by introducing a
licensing system for plays in the 1530s. 64 This licensing
system-inaugurated by a proclamation by Henry VIII in 1530-was
built on the foundations laid by the "ecclesiastical proscription of
particular books during the mid-1520s." 65 The control of plays was
further extended in the three decades or so that followed from London
to "places remote from the cities." 66 This allowed London to achieve a

57.
See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50.
58.
See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 222, 228, 238, 247-49. In 1655, Lord Protector
Cromwell established his own system. See id. at 229-33.
59.
See id. at 248.
60.
See id. at 271, 309. The stamp tax continued to be imposed after the Statute of Anne.
See Copyright Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c.45 (Eng.); Joseph M. Thomas, Swift and the Stamp Act of
1712, 31 PMLA 247, 248 (1916).
61.
See SIEBERT, supra note 25, at 249.
62.
Id. at 171.
63.
See id. at 249.
64.
E.K. CHAMBERS, THE ELIZABETHAN STAGE VOL. I 276 (1923).
65.
LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 28.
66.

JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, BEN JONSON AND POSSESSIVE AUTHORSHIP 17 (2002).
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"large measure of discursive hegemony" and to ensure that the
provinces were, well, "provincialized." 67
This licensing system meshed rather well with the consolidation
of the Company's monopoly on book printing, which would later morph
into-or at least provide foundations for-the Statute of Anne, the first
copyright statute. 68 Indeed, while the early Tudors had tried to
suppress "seditious and schismatic works" by granting printing patents,
late Elizabethan policy focused instead on licensing and then
"transferred the power to license, in practice, to the leadership of the
Stationers." 69
The attribution of plays to their respective authors was useful in
that context. It may have made licensing easier, but the author's
name-say Heywood or Shakespeare-functioned as a reminder to be
used against the author in case of "discontent" caused to the Crown if
the play was seen as containing "inappropriate" material. 70
Importantly, it also functioned as a way to attract audiences, making
the imprint of the author a "crucial element of the dramatic
commodity."7 1
The licensing of plays would open up new regulatory pathways.
The initial "copyright" was mostly a system to control the distribution
of books by regulating its immaterial content. 72 The licensing of music
and plays involved an additional intellectual step-namely, the
performance in public of the work, which could also be regulated and
made subject to a form of exclusive right.73 Intellectually, it would then
be a small step to create an exclusive right, not in the copying of works
(such as books or sheet music), but in the public performance of those
works as part of the copyright regime. Still today, these two
rights-reproduction and public performance-are the basic pillars of
copyright law.74 Although future regulatory expansions would extend
the public performance right from performing in front of live audiences

Id. at 18.
67.
68.
See Lee, supra note 32, at 323 ("Unlike the Crown, they were not so much concerned
about censorship as they were about controlling the entire publishing industry.").
69.
LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 38.
70.
See id. at 58.
71.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 28-29.
72.
73.
See id. at 58.
74.
Though, the US statute contains five "fundamental rights." See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
at 61 (1976) ("The five fundamental rights that the bill gives to copyright owners-the exclusive
rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display-are generally stated in
section 106.").

20191

THE RIGHT OFATTRIB UTION IN LITERAR Y WORKS

51

to new methods of reaching remote audiences such as radio, television,
and now the internet, the basic structure has remained.75
B. Act II: Recognizing the Author
In Act II, authors take center stage, both as appropriators of
existing works and as claimants of a "right" to be recognized as authors.
The State's interest in censorship is no longer the dominant factor.
Ironically perhaps, the authorial right of attribution in Act II
emerged mostly as a negative right; that is, it came about as a means
of defending famous authors from works falsely attributedto them with
a simple goal to sell more copies. Act II contains the core of the storyline,
in part because it coincides with the birth of modern copyright law.
The Act opens with the emergence of a norm of authorial
attribution and turns to the application of that norm to false
attributions. It then moves to the international scene and ends with the
embedding of author norms in early copyright law.
1. The Emergence of Authorial Attribution Norms During
Shakespeare's Lifetime
To attribute or not to attribute, that is, well, a question. Another
question arises: To whom? While the Stationers' Register insisted on
making the publisher'sname known, not the author's, the emergence of
an authorial attribution norm is visible during Shakespeare's lifetime.
Using the doctrinal vehicle of immaterial property that appeared
during Act I, it would eventually allow authors to claim a "right of
attribution."
The authors' wish to have their works attributed to them took a
progressively stronger normative hue precisely during Shakespeare
lifetime.7 6 For example, Professor Joseph Loewenstein traced two
successive publications of Richard the Second from 1597 and 1598, the
second adding the name of the author on the cover.77 Loewenstein
suggests that the year 1598 marked a "palpable shift" in attribution
practices. 7 8 This matters because that shift happened just four years
after Shakespeare's plays began to be performed almost exclusively by
the Lord Chamberlain's Men, a company co-owned by Shakespeare,

75.
See DANIEL GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE PATH TO
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 38-42 (2017).

76.
77.
78.

See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 40-42.
LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 66, at 61-62.
Id. at 61.
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which was the leading theater company in London at the time.7 9 In
other words, this palpable shift in the role of attribution coincided with
a time when Shakespeare himself might have seen the use of his name
as a matter of some importance.
Was Shakespeare a plagiarist? A simplistic answer to this
question would be "of course!" Indeed, by current standards,
Shakespeare borrowed much from previous texts without any formal
attribution.s0 Yet a better answer to that question should factor in a
historical component. This means looking at the matter not just from a
twenty-first-century perspective, using a contemporary definition of, for
example, the term plagiarism used in an institutional educational
context. As discussed in Section II.A, plagiarism means copying or
paraphrasing without attribution when this conflicts with an applicable
norm such as university regulations that students are typically
introduced

to

early

in

their

curriculum. 8 1

Applicable

norms

self-evidently vary through time and space. 82

79.

SAMUEL SCHOENBAUM,

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: A COMPACT DOCUMENTARY LIFE

183-84 (rev. ed. 1987).
80.
See DENNIS MCCARTHY & JUNE SCHLUETER, "A BRIEF DISCOURSE OF REBELLION AND
REBELS" BY GEORGE NORTH: A NEWLY UNCOVERED MANUSCRIPT SOURCE FOR SHAKESPEARE'S

PLAYS 90-94 (2018).
81.
See Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism:Legal and Ethical Implications for the
University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 35-37 (2010), who explains:
Colleges and universities have employed a variety of techniques intended to deter
students from the practice of plagiarism, to detect its presence, and to apply the
appropriate penalties. Those devices include academic honesty or plagiarism policies
articulated in college and university handbooks; online workshops or tutorials intended
to familiarize students with the forms of plagiarism and aid faculty in fostering
academic integrity; traditional honor codes that require a pledged promise both to
refrain from acts of academic dishonesty and to inform authorities of students who
violate the pledge; modified honor codes that solely require a pledge of academic
integrity and which are sometimes coupled with plagiarism-detection devices; integrity
codes which may or may not compel a signed pledge of adherence; Internet search
engines; techniques faculty can employ when scrutinizing student papers; and
plagiarism-detection software. (footnotes omitted).
82.
See Michael J. Perry, The Gospel According to Dworkin, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 163,
173 n. 32 (1994), finding:
In every human community across time and space, "moral norms are closely linked to
beliefs about the facts of human life and the world in which human life is set. . . . [W]hen
they formulate moral norms and impose them on themselves and others[, persons] are
trying to formulate relationships between realities and human purposes that allow
them 'to live as [they] would in a world that is the way it is."' (brackets in original)
(quoting from Robin W. Lovin & Frank E. Reynolds, Focus Introduction, 14 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 48, 56-57 (1986)).

Then there is the question of whether the supposed plagiarist knew the applicable norms. See id.
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Scholars have of course already suggested that "Shakespeare
was, in modern terms, a plagiarist on a vast scale." 83 One study showed
that out of "6,033 lines of parts I, II, and III of Henry VI, Shakespeare
copied 1,771 [lines] verbatim and paraphrased 2,373" and further that
"whole passages of Antony and Cleopatra ... were line-by-line
versifications" of preexisting works.84
Accusing Shakespeare of plagiarism today is anachronistic and
possibly unfair, even though the ambitious young Shakespeare was
accused of plagiarism even in his day. 85 The ethos of the time was quite
different, and the term "plagiarism" must be used with extreme caution.
The ethos of late sixteenth-century England allowed juxtaposition,
reuse, and transformation, and, for many people, attribution of material
created by others was seen as a simple expedient. 86 This ethos was
infused in medieval and premodern writers, and it was likely present
in Shakespeare's mind as well.8 7 No efforts were made to conceal
borrowings.8 8
As
Posner
noted,
"Anyone
who
knew
his
Plutarch ... would have recognized in it the barge scene from Antony
and Cleopatra."8 9 The purpose of the appropriation was to add, or
perhaps transform, but not steal.9 0
Did Shakespeare borrow because he was lazy? This can be
answered firmly in the negative. First, the writer for the Elizabethan
stage would likely have seen appropriation as normal, a term used here
with two meanings: empirically common and normatively acceptable.
Second, it may even have been prudent to borrow from historical
sources. 9 1 One reason Shakespeare did not make up his plays "may have
been that the Elizabethan theater was censored, and this may have
inclined playwrights to play it safe by working from plots and themes
found in earlier work." 92

83.
Frosio, supra note 20, at 368.
84.
Id. In this case, as Richard Posner has demonstrated, Sir Anthony's translation of
Plutarch'sLife. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 51-53.
85.
LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 87.
86.

See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

85 (2nd ed. 2005). Eisenstein notes, "If authors, editors, and publishers adopted 'the simple
expedient of being honest' by citing contributors, it was not because they were unusually noble but
because this simple expedient had become more satisfying to mixed motives." Id. (emphasis
added). The term unusually denotes the fact that attribution was not yet a broadly compelling
norm.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
See id.
POSNER, supra note 12, at 54.
See id. at 54-55.
See id. at 65.
Id.
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While these forms of appropriation matter to the literary
historian, they are of less import to the legal scholar considering social
and legal norms applicable at the time. Hence, the essence of the answer
to the question "Was he a plagiarist?" is no; it does not much matter
that Shakespeare was a protoplagiarist, from a strictly legal
perspective. A historian might want to offer a more nuanced answer,
however, and say that it does matter because-as noted above-the late
sixteenth century saw the first real signs of a push for attribution.
Moreover, if Shakespeare did plagiarize-as the term is understood
nowadays-he was also the victim of many false attributions, or reverse
plagiarism.

93

As Professor James Boyle

noted, there were

some

"fifty-six claimants to Shakespeare's throne."9'
The crux of the matter, however, is that if young Shakespeare
can be seen as having plagiarized when measured against today's
standards, he eventually developed an authorial "proprietary
sentiment" in his plays, as did others in his time. 95 This sentiment
coalesced around possessiveness in works of the mind and coincides
with Loewenstein's identification of 1598 as a pivotal year. 96 The main
issue to surface was not a lack of attribution but rather false attribution
to well-known authors. This would affect Shakespeare during the latter
part of his playwright career, after he acquired notoriety, and it is the
issue to which the Article now turns the spotlight.
2. Authorial Attribution Norms and False Attribution
(Reverse Plagiarism)
The emerging authorial attribution norm during Shakespeare's
lifetime was not used principally to insist on authorial attribution of
otherwise anonymous works; it was mainly used to prevent false
attribution.
False attribution of works to Shakespeare-sometimes by using
the initials "WS" or "W. Shakespeare"-was so widespread during his
lifetime and in the years that followed that many works cannot be
securely attributed to him. 9 7 This had surprising effects, including on
those who were less famous and whose works had been published in
this fashion. By publishing works that others had written under the WS
initials, some authors complained that people would think they had
93.
See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37
AM. U. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (1988).
94.
Id. at 627.
95.
Ben Jonson comes to mind. See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 82.
See id. at 61.
96.
97.
Id. at 63-64.
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"stolen" the work of Shakespeare.9 8 Heywood, for example, complained
in 1612 when the third edition of The Passionate Pilgrim or Certain
Amorous Sonnets, Between Venus and Adonis included two of
Heywood's epistles.9 9 Heywood complained that, as a professional
writer, the inclusion of his work in another book of works attributed to
"W. Shakespeare" would make him look like a plagiarist-that is,
people would think he had copied from Shakespeare and not the other
way around. 100 He has become a cause cdldbre-or texte cdldbre to use
Max Thomas's expression-in the annals of plagiarism. 10 1
Resistance to reverse plagiarism is not new. Poet Francesco
Petrarch, over two centuries earlier, had written the following to a
friend who had found texts attributed to Petrarch that were not really

his:
I laud your diligence but marvel at your uncertainty. For when I glanced at them, I
not only realized that they were not mine, but grieved and blushed, astonished that
others could think them mine or that they caused you any doubt. Therefore the
people attributing them to me are doubly in the wrong: they rob their author of his
work and burden me with what is not mine. If it is asked whom they are treating
worse, that is rather difficult to decide. .. . It is one thing to take away from
someone's praise, and quite another to pile dishonor on him. A great man will disdain
02
the first, but hate the second.1

Indeed, early comments on plagiarism seem to find false
attribution much worse a crime than failure to attribute. Petrarch's and
even Heywood's concerns were not about authorial attribution per se,
or reuse of preexisting content, but rather about loss of honor in being
seen as having written texts they had not-or in Heywood's case as
having taken verbatim a text written by another famous author.
Around the same time, editor Nicholas Ling published Helicon and
noted this in the preface:
If any man hath beene defrauded of any thing by him composed, by another mans
title put to the same, hee hath this benefit by this collection, freely to challenge his
owne in publique, where els he might be robd of his proper due. 0 3

The commoditization of culture had started in earnest. To riff off
Baudrillard, the work becomes an object because it is attributed (and
specifically in the case of art, when it is signed).

98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 63.
See id. at 63-64.
See id. at 64.
Thomas, supra note 19.

102.

FRANCIS PETRARCH, LETTERS OF OLD AGE 65-66 (Aldo S. Bernardo et al. trans., Johns

Hopkins Univ. Press, 1992).
103.

ENGLAND'S HELICON: A COLLECTION OF LYRICAL AND PASTORAL POEMS: PUBLISHED IN

1600 4 (A.H. Bullen ed., 1899).
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The "proper due" notion used here is interesting. It speaks
against the notion of separating moral and economic interests of
authors, and it provides a justification both to require attribution and
to prevent false attribution. Here again, the latter is seen as the worse
of the two violations.
Alternatively, one could say that these two forms of violation,
nonattribution and false attribution, are two sides of the same
normative coin. This is because, in both cases, the attribution of a
subject to the object is seen as creating value, both culturally and
commercially. This is the point at which the modern attribution norm
begins to coalesce. Although adding false value was initially seen as a
worse violation than failing to attribute, the added value of proper
attribution rests, in both cases, in the author's signature, which
entrenches the subject and allows the reader or viewer to perceive the
object's "differential value."104

The debate as to whether use of "WS," or Shakespeare's name in
other guises, was a way to sell or had to be properly authenticated as
the real source of the work thus marks a key inflection point in the
evolution of authorial attribution norms. Petrarch, Heywood, and Ling
share comparable perspectives concerning the risks of plagiarism. Their
primary focus is on misattribution, not on lack of attribution. While
they do not debate the derivative nature of any of the work at issue or
the appropriation, they see misattribution as perilous because it dilutes
the author's name, including in his relations with current and future
patrons. As Thomas noted in this context: "The difficulty with
plagiarism so-called is not that it takes away any particular property
from a particular writer, but rather that it renders it impossible to know
what the coin of that writer is made of."105
This insistence on the greater risk of false attribution versus
nonattribution is understandable from another, more mundane
perspective. The attribution of text has a great impact on the
commoditization function and thus a major role in the nomination and
circulation of books. 106 Nonattribution is unlikely to drive sales. In
contrast, misattribution is, to use Thomas's metaphor, like counterfeit
currency. 1 07

104.

JEAN BAUDRILLARD,

FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN

102-03 (1981).
105.
Thomas, supra note 19, at 286.
106.
John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Authors'Rights
in English Law and Practicein the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 455, 455 (1992).
Thomas, supra note 19, at 286.
107.
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The commoditization and mass circulation of books, which
started with the spread of the printing press in late fifteenth- and early
sixteenth-century Europe, freed authors from patrons.1 0 8 When works
were created by authors under a patronage system, a patron had a
direct relationship with the author. 109 The patron was in charge, and
works created under this system often went without attribution or
authorized misattribution. 110 Gradually, patrons started to want
"names" on the works they were subsidizing because attribution was
seen as adding value to the works, for the benefit of the owner of patron
first and the author incidentally.1 11 That value-for which patrons were
paying-required attribution to a named (famous) author. It could,
however, be undermined by false attributions. This increased the
importance of the author's name on the works actually created by that
author. This in turn may have reduced the importance of the work itself
and possibly the room for new, unknown authors to emerge, especially
those who initially created in significant part through imitation and
appropriation. The insistence on attributing, sometimes falsely, new
works to prestigious authors may also have "undermined the durable
institution of literary imitation." 112
The modern norm is somewhat different. It is reflected in the
constructivist rhetoric of "author as source," a source that needs to be
identified as a matter of propriety. 1 13 Although this rhetoric was present
in the debates that led to the adoption of the Statute of Anne, it did not
win the day: the statute created a property right in books but without
a formal right of attribution.1 1 4 For the bookseller, the key incentive was
to sell books, and the risk with false attribution was that the power of
attribution to increase a book's value would be diminished if, like
counterfeit currency, there was too much of it in circulation. Still, it is
possible to conclude this Section with the observation that, while the
plagiarism concerns that ran in the literary streets of Shakespearean
times in Stratford and elsewhere had commercially motivated wheels,
they were at least cognizant of the propriety of authorial attribution.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
Donaldson
114.

See supra note 2.
POSNER, supra note 12, at 68-69.
See id.
See id.
LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 87.
See Thomas, supra note 19, at 279; see also Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor:
v. Becket and the Genealogy ofModern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 51 (1988).
See Rose, supra note 113, at 52.
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3. The Emergence of an International Right of Authorial Attribution
The English story somewhat parallels efforts on the European
Continent to enshrine an authorial attribution norm in national laws
and international treaties.
The early insistence on attribution and integrity visible in
sixteenth-century Florence is reflected in the modern notion of droit
moral (also known as moral right), which in its most basic form includes
both a right of attribution and a right of integrity that Michelangelo
likely would have supported.1 15 That being said, legal historians do
not typically locate the root of the moral right in the soil of
sixteenth-century Florence but rather in the work of Kant and later
Hegel. 116 According to this view, a work of art emanates from a unique
relationship between an artist and the creative process, and "the
resultant art makes an artist unusually vulnerable to certain personal
harms." 117 The art is an extension of herself; the relationship to the art
is "more personal and simply qualitatively different from the
relationship of most other people to other objects and activities." 118
As a legal matter, a moral right reflecting this special
relationship between the author and her work only emerged
internationally in the eighteenth century. It is observed in its modern
instantiation in France after the French Revolution, which may explain
the use of the French term even in some English language literature.1 19
115.
See Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2002).
Suhi notes:
Until the middle of the Renaissance, the Catholic Church and wealthy patrons
overarched artists' creativity in Europe and England. As the Church's influence
decreased, artistic innovation and expression burgeoned. The expansion of artists'
creativity fostered the momentum for the assertion of artists' personal rights.
Michelangelo, capitalizing upon his outstanding reputation, first demanded the bundle
of rights that now fall under the umbrella of Moral Rights. In a sculpture commissioned
for a chapel in St. Peter's Cathedral, Michelangelo, first asserting his right of
attribution, secretly chiseled his name into the sculpture after hearing of the sculpture
being falsely attributed to his patron.
The emergence of a right of attribution in Florence followed an even earlier emergence of
something like an attribution norm in Venice. See supra note 3.
116.
See Swack, supra note 16; Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1532, 1541-42 (referring to the personhood theory of property of Hegel and Kant as
support for moral rights).
117.
Susan P. Liemer, UnderstandingArtists'MoralRights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
41, 43-44 (1998).
118.
Id.
119.
A search on Westlaw in April 2019 found 702 law review articles using the expression
in French, including Liemer. Id.; Swack, supra note 16; Sarah Ann Smith, The New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act: IncreasedProtectionand Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL
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These Franco-German notions of personhood in a literary and artistic
work reflected more than propriety; they were based on a natural
right-or in modern terms, a human right-of the author to be
recognized for the author's works. 120 This right would later be enshrined
in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works ("Berne Convention" or the "Convention"). 12 1 That Convention,
which binds 177 countries as of July 2019, provides that "independently
of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work."

122

This evolution differs from the British history. As the above
discussion shows, the early norm of attribution as it emerged in
Shakespeare's world functioned more as a market regulation tool than
as recognition of a Kantian link between the artist and her work. This
more commercial purpose may help explain why, as a formal matter,
the moral right did not enter British copyright law until the late
twentieth century. 123 However, while the modern right of attribution in
Britain dates back legislatively to 1988, the focus on false attribution
can be traced back much earlier to an 1862 statute, which contained a
rarely used tort of misattribution and was expanded in section 43 of the
Copyright Act 1956.124
4. Differences Between Copyright Norms and Attribution Norms
The differences between attribution and copyright are not
limited to the differences in the source, scope, and purpose of the
attribution right between Britain and the Continent described in the
previous Sections. The term of protection is probably the most visible
difference. In many countries, copyright ends seventy years after the
death of the author, but plagiarizing an old book no longer protected by
L. REV. 158, 158 (1984); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics, and the DroitMoral, 76 U.N.C.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1997); Laura Lee Van Velzen, InjectingaDose ofDuty into the DoctrineofDroit Moral,
74 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629 (1989).
120.
On the linkages between authors' rights and human rights, see generally Daniel
Gervais, How Intellectual Propertyand Human Rights CanLive Together: An Updated Perspective,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-26 (Paul L.C. Torremans, ed., 3rd ed. 2015).

121.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 6bis(1),
Sept. 9, 1886, 123 L.N.T.S. 233 (as revised by Paris Act, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
122.
See id. For a list of member States, see WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=15
[https://perma.cc/8HUY-99B8] (last visited May 2, 2019).
123.

See LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 233-35 (2001).

124.
Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, s. 7(4) (UK). It is now contained in the Copyright,
Designs and Patent Act 1988, c. 48 (UK).
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copyright is still plagiarism. 12 5 Further, there are defenses that one can
raise to a charge of copyright infringement, such as fair dealing or fair
use, but these defenses are often unavailable to the plagiarist. 12 6
Plagiarism and copyright also differ in what one might call the
levels of abstraction. The rule enshrined in both US law and
international instruments is that copyright protects the expression, not
the ideas contained in an author's expression. 127 While copyright
infringement is not limited to the taking of exact words only-and
admittedly the border between idea and expression can be fuzzy-a
charge of plagiarism might survive at a higher level of abstraction than
a claim of copyright infringement. 12 8 Posner gives the example of the
famous book The Da Vinci Code, which copied many details from an
earlier book, Holy Blood, Holy Grail, yet the authors of the earlier book
lost their copyright infringement suit in England. 129 Finally, a copyright
owner might authorize a taking from her work, but that again would
not defeat a claim of plagiarism if the source of the taking went
unmentioned. 130
To paraphrase Posner, while plagiarism conceals, copyright
infringement can take openly as it does in the case of a parody (indeed,
the parodic attempt fails if it doesn't conjure up the parodied work). 131
Plagiarism is fraud on the reader; copyright infringement may be fraud
on the author, and possibly the reader, but not necessarily so. 13 2 The

125.
The Berne Convention provides in its article 7 for a minimum of life plus fifty years,
but most countries, including the European Union and the United States, have now added twenty
years to this term. Berne Convention, supra note 121; see William F. Patry, The Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1995: Or How PublishersManaged to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661, 688-89 (1996) (explaining how both the European Union and the United
States extended copyright by twenty years).
126.
POSNER, supra note 12, at 12-16 (Posner suggests that plagiarism might be used to
show that a use was unfair).
127.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). This rule is contained, for instance, in article 10(2) of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC,
(1994) 33 I.L.M. 81.
128.
POSNER, supra note 12, at 13.
129.
See id.
130.
Plagiarism may thus be viewed from the reader's perspective, and the source is
acknowledged for the reader's benefit or to allow the reader to assess the respective contributions
of the author of the quoted text(s) and of the text in which the quotes appear.
131.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) (a parody must
'conjure up at least enough of [the] original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
132.
For example, a pirate can copy a book, including its cover, with the actual author name
on it and sell it, which would amount to copyright infringement but not plagiarism. Interestingly,
this is reportedly common, and the pirated editions may contain mistakes that may affect the
author's reputation. See David Streitfeld, What Happens After Amazon's DominationIs Complete?
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normative picture is very different. The function attributed to
trademark may be used to distinguish the shift: plagiarism as it is
defined nowadays prevents reliance by the reader on the name of the
(real) author in the same way a trader cannot rely on the trademark of
another to sell her wares. 133 It may invite undue reliance on the
plagiarist and correspondingly too little reliance on the original author,
as is the case with "passing off." 1 34 Hence, plagiarism is not so much
about the work being plagiarized as it is about the identity of the author
being misused or misappropriated. 135 It is not surprising, therefore,
that it is only when the identity of the author started to matter that
plagiarism became a malum in se. 136 Copyright infringement may
perhaps be viewed, in contrast, as a malumprohibitum, at least in cases
credibly close to the fair dealing-fair use border. 137
In this Act, the international norms concerning attribution to
authors were incorporated in the Berne Convention. Their focus is
squarely on the right of the author and reflects in part a continental
natural rights perspective on the nature of authorial expression. 138
International norms do not reflect what one might call the "mixed"
English norm, with its commercial overtones and its stronger focus on
false attribution over lack of attribution. 139
Its Bookstore Offers Clues, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/technology/amazon-domination-bookstore-books.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock
[https://perma.cc/GTW8-SQT7].
133.
See Trademark CounterfeitingAct of 1982: Hearingon S. 2428 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter) ("[T]rademark
counterfeiting .. . if freely permitted . .. would eventually destroy the incentive of trademark
owners to make the investments in quality control, promotion and other activities necessary to
establishing strong marks and brand names.") (S. 2428 was a proposed amendment to strengthen
the laws against counterfeiting of federally registered trademarks) (quoted in J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 (5th ed.)).
134.
See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Golden, 171 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1948) ("When one orders
parts by name of manufacturer, number and description, he has a right to have his order filled as
given, and if substitutions are made in circumstances calculated to lead the purchaser to believe
he is getting what he orders when he is not, it is not only a fraud upon the purchaser but also upon

the manufacturer of the goods ordered for which the substitution was made.") (emphasis added).
135.
See id.
136.
Malum in se means wrong in itself. By contrast, a malum prohibitum is wrong only
because it is prohibited. See Richard L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between
Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1370 (1995).
137.
This is the traditional distinction between crimes or violations that are "wrong
because prohibited' and those that are "wrong by themselves." See Einer Elhauge,
Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2196 (2002); see also

Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum, 4
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that an "act of infringement needs to be defined
such that it is indeed malum in se rather than simply malum prohibitum").
See Liemer, supra note 117, at 41-42.
138.
See Swack, supra note 16, at 381.
139.

62

2AND. J ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:1:39

Shakespeare's claim to protect his name thus overlaps
normatively with only some aspects of the international moral right
norm. The international law norm is more Michelangelo than
Shakespeare.
C. Act III: Societal Interests
In Act III, authorial attribution norms undergo a
transformation-some might say a death and rebirth in a different
guise. The shift is not in the doctrinal vehicle used, for copyright law as
it emerged in the early eighteenth century is still largely the
same: protecting against reproduction (or copying) and public
performance in front of live audiences or at a distance. 140 The very
notion of author changes in this Act and, with it, the authorial norms to
which it can provide normative support, if any. 141
This Act considers first how authorial norms have given way, at
least in part, to norms focused on readers' interest-namely, attribution
performs a trademark function to guide the reader's choice. The Act
ends with a look at the implications of this shift for the future of
authorial attribution norms.
1. Attribution: For Whose Benefit?
Readers of books and plays in Shakespeare's time had an
interest both in reading famous authors and in knowing about the
authors' personal lives. The lives of famous authors, as well as those of
other celebrities, have remained a matter of interest to the public,
though not necessarily a matter of public interest.
Even after Barthes, Foucault, and New Criticism declared the
author dead, the biographical background of authors has remained
important-for example, to perform some of the functions of literary
criticism. 14 2 Moreover, even among postmodern critics of authorship

theories, an antiplagiarism norm exists: those scholars may not want to
find out the hard way whether their faculty disciplinary committee is
aligned with postmodernist views. 143
Yet the normative foundations of attribution in Act III
unmistakably changed when compared to those of the previous Acts.

140.
See GERVAIS, supra note 75.
141.
Interestingly, the US Constitution is a reflection of its time, as it refers specifically to
exclusive rights in the writings of "Authors." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, cl. 8.
142.
See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171,
1184-85 (2005).
143.
See id
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The current zeitgeist considers the name of the author mostly as an
indication of the source of the work.144 This norm is meant to
reflect-and is normatively aligned with-consumers' and readers'
interests, not those of the author.14 5 They thus function like
trademarks. Trademarks are not meant primarily to protect producers;
they assure consumers of a certain quality.1 4 6 A bottle of Coca-Cola
should taste the same anywhere in the world.14 7 The consumer need not
know exactly which legal entity produced and bottled it, for it may not
be the trademark owner.14 8 The trademark owner must only provide a
"guarantee" of uniform quality, and thus exercise some form of control,
of the product's manufacturing. 149 To that extent, trademarks are often
fictions.15 0 For example, major pharmacy and supermarket chains in a
number of countries sell products under their trademarks, but they do
not produce those products. 15 1
Like trademarks, the attribution of literary works can also have
a fictional character. This is not new. Ghostwriting has been around for
centuries or more. 152 Even Rembrandt is said to have signed works by
inferior painters, using his "trademark" to sell paintings. 153 Biblical
books are attributed to "authors" who did not write them, as many
144.

See id.

145.

See id.

146.

See

J.

THOMAS

MCCARTHY,

MCCARTHY

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 2:4 (5th ed.) ("Without marks, a seller's mistakes or low quality products would be
untraceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks create an incentive to keep up a good
reputation for a predictable quality of goods.").
147.
Hence a restaurant is not allowed to substitute a different product (e.g., Pepsi-Cola)
when the patron orders Coca-Cola, at least not without warning the customer. See Coca-Cola Co.
v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (enjoining a restaurant's substitution of
Pepsi-Cola in response to orders for Coca-Cola).
148.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 146, § 3:12 ("A trademark identifies a single source. But
this does not mean that the buyer must know the identity of that 'single source' in the sense that
she knows the corporate name of the producer or seller.").
149.
See id. § 3:11.
150.
See Barbara Thau, As Power of Name Brands Wanes, CVSIs Betting on Private Labels
to Revive Sales, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2017/10/12/aspower-of-name-brands-wanes-cvs-is-betting-on-private-labels-to-revive-sales/#717b8 1b04ef2
[https://perma.cc/J77P-3DDD] (discussing how CVS purchases "private label" products from a
variety of sources but noting that " [u]nlike competitors that often outsource these functions, CVS
boasts that its in-house quality assurance team sets the standard in the industry for product
testing in terms of factory auditing").
151.
See id.
152.
Without offering a history of ghostwriting, it is widely acknowledged by biblical
scholars that the Gospels were ghostwritten. See, e.g., GNOSTICA, JUDAICA, CATHOLICA.
COLLECTED ESSAYS OF GILLES QUISPEL 475 (Johannes Van Oort, ed.) (2008); see also JOHN C.
KNAPP & AZALEA M. HULBERT, GHOSTWRITING AND THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 11 (2017)

(referring to the "ancient roots" of ghostwriting).
See POSNER, supra note 12, at 26.
153.
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Pauline letters are now thought to have been written by others. 154 In
the case of Rembrandt and ghostwritten books, isn't the name of the
"author" that appears on the work a mere trademark? That "author"
would have agreed to the use of her name and may even have proofread
and edited the work. In the case of biblical books, the (unauthorized)
attribution may have been a means of increasing the dissemination of
the ideas contained in the letter, though there were in some cases other
motivations at play. 155 The difference between the two situations, other
than the fact that different attribution norms and reader expectations
applied in the two contexts, is that biblical letters were not sold for
financial compensation.
In Act III, names of authors are perhaps best described as
trademarks meant to generate sales. This phenomenon was observed in
Shakespeare's time, 15 6 but there are key differences.
2. The Normative Shift
There is a fil conducteur that connects all three Acts-namely,
that attribution can create value. The difference is in for whom it
creates value. In that respect, Act III is fundamentally different. Act I
is about attribution to a source with censorship in mind. Act II is about
acknowledging the author, with a focus in England more on preventing
false attribution than on recognizing a positive right of attribution to
authors, although the authorial norm did emerge there as well. Act II
also saw an unmistakably author-focused authorial attribution norm be
enshrined as an author's right in a number of national laws on the
European Continent and in the principal copyright treaty, the Berne
Convention. 15 7 In contrast, Act III is all about the reader or "user" and
broader societal interests. Attribution norms still protect the author,
but the author is no longer the self-evident normative justification.
An example might help illuminate the shift. Consider plagiarism
in the familiar, modern context of higher education. 15 8 The driving
concern there is clearly not nonattribution as authorial practice; it is
the integrity and fairness of educational processes and the degrees to
154.
John Dominic Crossan, The Search for the Historical Paul: Which Letters Did He
Really Write?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/apostle-paul-lettersb 890387 [https://perma.cc/9KEU-45PM]; see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 122 ("Who
wrote Socrates' lines, Aristotle's works, Sappho's poems, any portion of the scriptures?").
155.

See LEWIS R.

DONELSON,

PSEUDEPIGRAPHY AND

ETHICAL ARGUMENTS

IN THE

PASTORAL EPISTLES 16-18 (explaining that at least some letters were written to denigrate the
named author, and others as respect for a great figure).
156.
See supra Section II.A.2.
See Berne Convention, supra note 121, at 241-42; Patry, supra note 125.
157.
See Latourette, supra note 81.
158.
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which they lead. 15 9 There is a societal impact of failure to attribute
correctly or at all that reaches well beyond any aggrieved author and,
indeed, only protects her as a "side effect." 160 Put differently, although
current rules against plagiarism and modern copyright share a similar
doctrinal vector-namely, the need to attribute correctly-they derive
from a different normative source. Current plagiarism and attribution
rules are meant to allow the reader, including educators, to rely on the
source of the material. 16 1 They thus differ significantly from those born
in the font of Renaissance individualism. 162
From this perspective, attribution nowadays performs a filtering
function. Just like the trademarks affixed to commercially sold goods,
attribution has value in that it reduces a consumer's search costs. 1 63
The reader who likes a certain author-say, Margaret Atwood, Paul
Auster, or Antony Trollope-expects at the very least that any book
with the author's name on it was written by the named author. The
reader's expectations might increase in hopes that a "new" book by the
same author will have a similar literary taste as other books from the
same author that this reader previously read. This is not all that
different from the role played by a trademark on a food product for
which the consumer may have two similar expectations: that the
product is made by or under the control of the trademark owner and
that it will taste the same as other products bearing the same mark that
the consumer purchased in the past. 164
Attribution in Acts I and II is also meant to sell books. 165 There
is a difference, however. Though in Act I the normative threads are
intertwined, in Act II attribution norms are authorial norms with

&

159.
See Samuel J. Horovitz, Two Wrongs Don't Negate a Copyright: Don't Make Students
Turnitin if You Won't Give It Back, 60 FLA. L. REV. 229, 232, 235 (2008) ("[A]cademic institutions
face the daunting challenges of promoting honesty and respect for the work of others and of
ensuring the integrity of the learning and grading processes."); see also Jennifer N. Buchanan
Joseph C. Beckham, A Comprehensive Academic Honor Policy for Students: Ensuring Due Process,
PromotingAcademic Integrity, and Involving Faculty, 33 J.C. & U.L. 97, 104-05 (2006).
160.
See Horovitz, supra note 159, at 235.
161.
Id.
162.
See supra Section III.B.2.
163.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 147, § 2:5 ("[T]rademarks reduce the buyer's cost of
collecting information about goods and services by narrowing the scope of information into brand
segments rather than have the buyer start a new search process with each purchase.").
164.
ADRIAN
KUENZLER,
RESTORING
CONSUMER
SOVEREIGNTY:
How MARKETS
MANIPULATE US AND WHAT THE LAW CAN Do ABOUT IT 61 (2017) ("Reputations based on consistent

past performance economize on the costs of information about the anticipated performance of a
good.... [C]onsumers will sensibly use the brand name or reputation of the maker as a basis of
choice."); see ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 193 (2nd ed. 1977).

165.

See POSNER, supra note 12, at 68-69.
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commercial effect; in Act III, the norms are commercial norms with
authorial effect. This shift is also in line with trademark law, as
protection of the interests of trademark owners is sometimes described
as a side effect of the protection of consumer interests. 166 In the third
Act, the shift of emphasis from author to reader also means that selling
by the author is less important. This might explain the ever-greater role
played by sharing sites, like YouTube, where many copyrighted works
are made available without payment, from texts to photography to
music, based on recommendations of other users or preference-based
algorithms that can be paid to influence preferences and make
"personalized" recommendations, rather than traditional promotion. 167
Because so much content is available free of charge (though often
accompanied by advertisement), the user quite often can decide what
she wants to pay for, if anything. 168
This is directly comparable to the traditional function of a
trademark. US courts in particular have "gravitate[d] toward viewing
the elimination of consumer confusion as the animating purpose of
trademark law." 169 As noted above, the protection of the
markholder- or, in our case, the author-is almost a "side effect" of
protecting the consumer. 170 This happened fairly surreptitiously, and
this normative shift in trademark law has had few perceptible doctrinal
effects. 1 71 US courts have moved from producer- to consumer-animated
principles, but in spite of this major shift, in most cases they "reach the
same results." 172

166.
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (2007).
See Kristelia A. Garcia, Copyright Arbitrage, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 248-49 (2019);
167.
Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 308 n. 159 (2009) (this has been referred to as
'consumer-determined value"); see also Rustan Kosenko & R. Krishnan, Consumer Price Limits
and the Brand Effect, 5 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 153, 153-54 (1990) (the idea of "consumer-determined
value" may be somewhat misleading because every purchasing decision is theoretically a decision
that the price paid is acceptable).
168.
This is a process that started with Napster and similar technologies. See Michael D.
Scott, The Ninth Circuit Rules in the Napster Controversy, 6 CYBERSPACE L. 1, 1 (Mar. 2001)
(noting, in a discussion of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision essentially
shutting down Napster, that "it is an important short-term victory for the record industry, and
provides an important impetus to Napster and other online music providers to create a new
business model where users pay for the music they want. Whether Internet users are willing to
pay ANYTHING for music, however, is still an open question.") As of 2019, that is still a partly
open question. See Garcia, supra note 167, at 242.
169.
William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn't Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 253, 270-71 (2013).
170.
See id.
See id. at 273-74.
171.
172.
See id
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Whether one uses the doctrines of copyright law or trademark
law to enforce attribution norms does not matter much: either one can
perform the function of putting the name of the author on copies of her
works. 173 Indeed, copyright law has begun to shape itself along
trademark lines: US law and international instruments have reinforced
attribution by making it illegal to remove the author's name (as part of
"rights management information") on digital copies of works.174 Authors
have also embraced the shift, and a number of famous authors have
actually begun to register their names as trademarks.1 75
It is worth underscoring a positive political economic impact of
this shift towards the "trademarkization" of attribution: it may increase
the purchase of attribution norms in the United States. The principal
reason that has prevented the United States from recognizing a full
attribution right in federal copyright law has arguably been the
foreignness of the authorial attribution norms enshrined in
international legal instruments.17 6 As noted above, international
attribution norms are part of what the Berne Convention refers to as
the "moral right."17 7 This right emerged in Continental Europe and is
"said to encompass three major components: the right of disclosure, the
right of paternity [attribution], and the right of integrity." 178
This "European" moral right-and in particular the right to
preserve the artistic integrity of a work and the right to prevent first
publication (or disclosure)-was established in recognition of the

173.
It is true that the right of attribution also protects the right to publish anonymously
and under a pseudonym. In the latter case, whether the name of the author is a pseudonym or not
does not change the attribution's role as a trademark. See Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX.
A&ML. REV. 873, 899 (2014); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences,
and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1537-38, 1563 (2007). An anonymous work
bears no trademark and would be an exception, but relatively few works are published
anonymously. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 U. HOUS. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2004).
174.
See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 26 (2009); Yu, supra note 173.

175.
See, e.g., J K ROWLING, Registration No. 4248213 (registered on November 27, 2012,
for various goods and services, including "entertainment information specifically related to books
and movies in the nature of news, online games that provide entertainment information regarding
books and movies").
176.
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10-12, 17-18 (1985).
Berne Convention, supra note 121.
177.
178.
Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordanceof Copyright Law and
Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 608
(2001) (the Berne Convention describes it at its minimum level as attribution and integrity only);
Kwall, supra note 176, at 5; Sidney A. Diamond, Legal Protectionfor the 'Moral Rights" of Authors
and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 249 (1978).
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authors' interests discussed in Act 11.179 An author-focused perspective
is hard-though not impossible-to reconcile with a reader- or
user-focused normative view. One can always argue that a reader may
want to know if the work attributed to an author has been altered, for
example, but in terms of determining the scope of the right, and
exceptions thereto, knowing on which normative foot one must dance
(either author or user) seems essential.
In some countries, the moral right goes further still. In France,
it includes a right of withdrawal-that is, a right to "recall all existing
copies of her work" following publication. 180 This right seems most
definitely harder to reconcile with readers' interests in that it allows
"substantial scope for artists to behave opportunistically or
eccentrically." 18 1 In practice, it is seldom used, as the author must
compensate those who relied on a license to produce and sell copies of
the work. 182
The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, and on
that occasion established a limited "moral right" only applicable to
works of fine arts in a way that makes the United States' compliance
with its international obligations

highly dubious.

1 83

Whether the

amendment to the Copyright Act produced its intended effect in
securing a functioning moral right even in the limited area of fine arts
is doubtful to say the least.18 4 That said, US compliance with
international law in this area is an interesting, yet mostly theoretical,
debate, as there is no international dispute-settlement mechanism that
See Kwall, supra note 176, at 2-3.
179.
180.
Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 597 (2006);
Gunlicks, supra note 178, at 615.
181.
Marina Santilli, United States'MoralRights Developments in EuropeanPerspective, 1
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 94 (1997).
182.
See Piotraut, supra note 180, at 608 ("The limitations and obligations arising under
droit de retrait in French copyright law are so broad that the right is rarely used."); see also
Rebecca Bolin, Locking Down the Library: How Copyright, Contract, and Cybertrespass Block
Internet Archiving, 29 HASTINGS COMMUN. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39 (2006) ("The right to withdraw, or
droit de retrait ou de repentir, is a very rare European moral right, or droit moral, and theoretically
gives an artist a limited right to reclaim and destroy published work.").
183.
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, § 603(a), 104 Stat.
5128, 5128-33 (1990) (codified by 17 U.S.C. § 106A) (the moral right in question was added by the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)) (VARA was passed on December 1, 1990, and became
effective on June 1, 1991); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853, Appendix II, n. 2; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, U.S. Federalism and Intellectual
Property, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 463, 470 (1996); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress:
Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the ArchitecturalWorks Copyright ProtectionAct
of 1990, 14 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 477, 481 (1990).
184.
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1, 33 (1997).
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can be used to bring a case against the United States.1 85 The more
important aspect for our purposes is whether the United States should
provide a right of attribution for other reasons, and if so, why.
The United States may need other reasons to justify a right of
attribution, because the normative underpinnings of the right of
attribution in the Berne Convention discussed in Act II hardly seem
compatible with the zeitgeist today. As the ghost of author-centered
attribution norms heads backstage and is replaced by reader-centered
attribution norms, the protection of the right of attribution should no
longer be viewed as a doctrine with foreign normative underpinnings to
be painfully squeezed into some corner of US law. A right of attribution
on works of fine art is contained in the Visual Artists Rights Act. 186 This
Article argues that a much more powerful right of attribution made its
way in US law when Congress enacted protections against the removal
of "rights management information" on digital copies of copyrighted
works in 1998.187 This strengthened the attribution right, especially
vis-A-vis other components of a Berne Convention-compatible "moral
right" and the right of integrity not included in the 1998
amendments. 188
Though Act III's focus on the readers' interest militates in favor
of a limited moral right not focused on authorial control but rather on
attribution qua attribution, this could, as noted above, be accompanied
by an "integrity mechanism" to inform readers of modifications to a
work not made by the author.18 9 This arguably would comply with the
Berne Convention but for reasons dramatically different from those

185.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, annex 2, art. 1,
108 stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; Berne Convention, supra note 121, at Article 33(1) 274-75
(providing that disputes under the Berne Convention are to be resolved by the International Court
of Justice). There would, in theory, be two options. The first would be the World Trade
Organization's state-to-state dispute-settlement system, but that system is not applicable to a case
based on noncompliance with moral rights obligations. Elizabeth Sch6r6, Where is the Morality?
Moral Rights in InternationalIntellectual Property and Trade Law, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 773,
779 (2018). Second, the International Court of Justice technically has jurisdiction under Article 33
of the Berne Convention, but that court's jurisdiction is "no longer subject to unilateral compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction." George K. Walker, Sources of InternationalLaw and the Restatement (Third),
ForeignRelations Law of the United States, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 32 (1988).
186.
See J. Carlos Fern6dez-Molina & Eduardo Peis, The Moral Rights of Authors in the
Age of Digital Information, 52 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 109, 113 (2001).
See id. at 115.
187.
188.
See id.
189.
See id.
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that animated the nineteenth-century Romantics who penned the
Convention's draft. 19 0

It is worth noting as this Act closes that, after a detailed
historical and normative analysis of plagiarism, Nimmer suggested
that there should be a moral right against passing off-that is, using
someone else's work with one's name on it-but that, "as a general
matter, by contrast, the reverse should be limited to specialized
settings, such as academia, where attribution lies at the core of the
raison d'Otre for the creation of works." 191 He is suggesting that the
distinction between false attribution and nonattribution present on the
Elizabethan stage has not been resolved, at least as a matter of US law.
He may well be right. Act III's shift towards the reader or user makes
reconciling the two easier.
IV. EPILOGUE

The three Acts of attribution in literary works show the
emergence of an authorial norm of attribution, how it was enshrined in
international copyright law, and the subsequent transformation of the
authorial norm that supported this enshrinement to a current norm
more focused on readers' interests. This transformation does not mean
that attribution is dead. Quite the opposite. It should thrive in the
current environment. To quote the chorus at the end of Henry V, though
the story of the right of attribution was perhaps written "with rough
and all-unable pen . . . in your fair minds let this acceptance take." 192
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See Fern6dez-Molina & Peis, supra note 186; Swack supra note 16, at 362, 369, 372,
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Nimmer, supra note 14, at 77.
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